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INTRODUCTION
"BOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO" says Jozy
Altidore, United States National Soccer Team member, via Twitter.'
Sports Illustrated's Grant Wahl tweeted, "Choosing Qatar and Russia
is the biggest indictment possible that FIFA is not a clean
organization. Petrodollars talk." 2 "I can't believe this, man. I've
been to Qatar. Good ally and all, but NOT a place to party and
celebrate the World Cup," said TV star and Seattle Sounders co-owner
Drew Carey.3 These were only three tweets amidst a sea of criticism
surrounding the F~dration Internationale de Football Association's
(FIFA) decision to award the 2022 World Cup to Qatar.4 This
decision was perplexing in large part because FIFA's own technical
report said that Qatar's high summer temperatures could pose a health
risk to players, officials and spectators.5  The selected bid was
especially agonizing for Americans because the United States was
considered a frontrunner for the bid. So with rumors of misconduct
floating in the air, many Americans were left feeling as though they
had been cheated out of hosting a World Cup.
Soccer has been increasing in popularity in the United States, with
more people watching the 2010 FIFA World Cup championship match
1. US Players, Pundits React to Losing 2022 World Cup Bid to Qatar,
AOLNEWS.COM (Dec. 2, 2010, 12:50 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/12/02/
us-reactions-to-losing-2022-world-cup-bid-to-qatar/ [hereinafter US Players React].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Timeline of Events Surrounding FIFA Corruption Claims, BBC SPORT,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/13601803.stm (last updated June 1, 2011,
19:06 UK) [hereinafter Timeline].
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than the average number of viewers watching the 2009 World Series
between the New York Yankees and Philadelphia Phillies.6 It seemed
that many who supported the U.S. bid for the 2022 World Cup and the
sport of soccer in general hoped a successful bid would continue
soccer's growth in popularity in the United States. In fact, the U.S.
bid team used the growth of soccer as a sales pitch to FIFA prior to
the vote for the 2022 World Cup.7 When FIFA awarded the cup to
Qatar, the United States lost out on a potentially large profit, as the
United States made fifty million dollars when the World Cup was last
here in 1994.
This Comment will show that under the current rules and
regulations of FIFA, the United States and other members of FIFA
remain essentially powerless to challenge the 2022 award decision
despite the potential influence of bribery and other misconduct in the
bid process.
Section I discusses the structure of FIFA as well as the history and
development of the FIFA World Cup bidding process. This section
argues that FIFA's current bidding and voting processes need revising
because of the possibility of European bias and opportunities for
voting misconduct. Section II explains the current controversy
surrounding the 2022 Qatar bid. Section III explores what remedies
within FIFA might currently exist that would allow the Qatar bid to be
rescinded. Section IV explains why FIFA is unlikely to rescind the
bid.
Section V argues that FIFA's recently created reform plans result
in little change because of FIFA's refusal to look into past
controversies. Section VI analyzes the proposals made by author
Ryan Gauthier and the non-governmental organization, Transparency
International (TI), to improve FIFA's bidding and voting processes.
This section concludes that Gauthier's proposal does not provide
enough change to FIFA, and that TI's plan is so extreme that FIFA
6. Ken Belson, Soccer's Growth in the U.S. Seems Steady, N.Y. TIMES (July
24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/sports/soccer/24soccer.html.
7. U.S. Stresses Diversity in Bid, ESPN (Dec. 1, 2010, 7:03 PM ET),
http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/news/_/id/5869756/us-stresses-diversity-2022-
world-cup-bid.
8. Soccer Exceeds Gooooal: World Cup: Event Had $50-Million Profit.
Rothenberg is Awarded a $3-Million Bonus, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 1994),
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-10-19/sports/sp-52028_1_world-cup.
5432012]
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would not likely implement it. Finally, Section VII offers a solution
which combines principles of the previous proposals while adding
additional safeguards to prevent misconduct. This approach utilizes
technical evaluations of bids, implements a multi-level voting system,
seeks to promote transparency within FIFA, and otherwise instills
confidence in World Cup fans that the proper World Cup bid is
chosen.
I. FDRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION (FIFA)
A. Structure of FIFA
FIFA is the world-governing agency for international football, or
soccer, as it is known in the United States. Based in Zurich,
Switzerland, FIFA is established under Swiss Law.9 It was created in
1904 in Paris through an agreement between the football associations
of France, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland.10  FIFA is divided into legislative, executive, and
administrative bodies, which carry out the various functions of the
organization.1 '
FIFA's legislative body, the Congress, is comprised of all FIFA's
member associations. Each member association is given one vote.12
In the past, the Congress met every two years, but it has met annually
since 1998, allowing the Congress to help decide the ever-increasing
number of issues arising in soccer.' 3
FIFA's executive body is comprised of the Executive Committee,
which "consists of a President, elected by the Congress in the year
following a FIFA World Cup, eight vice-presidents and fifteen
members that are appointed by the various confederations and
associations."1 4 Each member's appointment term lasts four years.
9. Ryan Gauthier, Improving the Bidding Process for International Sporting
Events, 1-2 INT'L SPORTS L.J. 3, 11-12 (2011).
10. Id. (citing History of FIFA-Foundation, FIFA.cOM, http://www.fifa.com/
classicfootball/history/fifa/historyfifal.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010)).
11. Bodies, FIFA.cOM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/
index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing FIFA Statutes: Regulations Governing the Application of the
4
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The Executive Committee meets at least twice a year. 16  Its
responsibilities include setting tournament times, places, and
formats.17
The General Secretariat is the administrative body."s Twenty-five
standing committees and two judicial bodies, the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee and the FIFA Appeal Committee, assist the General
Secretary of FIFA." Their functions are to make decisions regarding
the organization of competitions and the general development of
soccer.20 The Executive Committee is responsible for ratification of
these committees' decisions.21
The responsibilities of all of the branches of FIFA are important
to understanding how FIFA's laws are interpreted, as well as how
procedures such as the World Cup bidding process are divided within
FIFA.
B. Laws of FIFA
FIFA has established its own laws, called the FIFA Statutes,
which lay out how FIFA operates and the FIFA membership rules.22
Included within these statues are rules for discipline, the FIFA World
Cup bidding process, and the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration
for Sport.23
Although FIFA's statutes discuss the World Cup's bidding
process in Articles 37 and 76, the process is not entirely clear.24
Article 37 states, "[t]he Organising Committee for the FIFA World
Cup shall organise the FIFA World Cup in compliance with the
Statutes, arts. 30-31 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/
affederation/generic/01/48/60/05/fifastatuten20 11 %5fe.pdf [hereinafter FIFA
Statutes]).
15. Bodies, supra note 11 (citing FIFA Statutes, supra note 14, arts. 30-3 1).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. FIFA Statutes, supra note 14, arts. 35, 54.
22. Id.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See Gauthier, supra note 9, at 16-17.
2012] 545
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provisions of the regulations applicable to this competition, the List of
Requirements and the Organising Association Agreement." 2 5 Article
76 specifies that the Executive Committee shall "decide the venue for
the final competitions organized by FIFA. As a rule, tournaments
may not be held on the same continent on two successive occasions.
The Executive Committee shall issue guidelines in this connection."26
The statutes do not provide much insight into how the bidding
process truly operates. A look into the history of the bidding process
provides a better picture of the how this process works in practice.
C. FIFA's World Cup Bidding Process
The FIFA World Cup bidding process has changed multiple times
throughout the years.2 7 Early on, few countries submitted bids to host
the World Cup, and often many of the bidders dropped out, leaving
one country to host the event.28 Uruguay hosted the first World Cup
in 1930, but an actual vote to decide the host country was not required
until the third cup in 1938.29 After World War II, the next three
World Cups from 1950-1958 were awarded to the host countries
uncontested.30 The bids in 1962, 1966, and 1970 were highly
contested, but only two submitted bids each time.3' The 1974-1982
Cups were again voted on without any competition for the host
country.32 These selections were made in 1966, which was the first
time FIFA decided to select three hosts simultaneously. 33 Until 1966,
the FIFA Congress had selected the host country, with each national
association casting one vote. 34 After 1966, however, the Executive
Committee took over the responsibility of selecting hosts for future
25. FIFA Statutes, supra note 14, art. 37.
26. Id. art. 76.
27. Gauthier, supra note 9, at 12
28. Id.
29. Id. (France was selected over Argentina and Germany).
30. Id. (Brazil, Switzerland and Sweden hosting).
31. Id. (Chile, England and Mexico were awarded the 1962, 1966, and 1970
bids, respectively).
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id.
34. Id.
6
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World Cups. 35 The process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups was
similar to the 1966 process, as FIFA decided to vote on bids for both
of the World Cups simultaneously. 36 This change was surprising, as
the subject of changing the bidding process was not even on the
Congress's agenda.37
In short, the current bidding process consists of three stages: (1) a
country submits its bid to FIFA; (2) FIFA visits each potential host
country; and (3) the Executive Committee votes to determine the host
country. 38  Also, for the most recent bidding decisions, technical
evaluations of the potential host countries were compiled.39
The first mention of corruption within this process was in 2000,
when the Executive Committee voted to have Germany host the 2006
World Cup.40 Germany defeated Brazil and Morocco in early rounds
and won the final vote over South Africa 12-1 1.41 Allegations of
corruption and complaints about lack of transparency followed this
vote, as the Oceana delegate abstained from the final vote "despite
instructions from his region to support South Africa." 42 Had he
followed these instructions, the vote would have ended in a 12-12 tie.
FIFA President Sepp Blatter, who supported a South Africa bid,
would have broken the tie. 43
After this, FIFA instituted a rotation system designed to rotate the
World Cup by Continental Confederation. 44 However, this system
was ended in 2007 after the World Cup was awarded to South Africa
in 2010 and Brazil in 2014.45 Blatter claimed the "rotation policy"
was discontinued because it had achieved its purpose of bringing the
35. Id.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 15.
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id.
40. Richard Pomfret, John K. Wilson & Bernhard Lobmayr, Bidding for Sport
Mega-Events 12 (The Univ. of Adelaide, School of Econ., Working Paper No. 0089,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1566283
(follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
41. Id. at 12 n.16.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Gauthier, supra note 9, at 14.
45. Id.
2012] 547
7
Morris: FIFA World Cup 2022: Why the United States Cannot Successfully Ch
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2012
548 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
World Cup to Africa for the first time and to South America for the
first time in "many years." 46
Bias has always been an issue with FIFA in general, as they have
been accused in the past of being biased towards Europe.47 The vast
majority of World Cups have been in Europe, and until Brazil hosts
the 2014 World Cup (following the 2010 Cup hosted by South
Africa), at least every other World Cup has been hosted by a European
country.48 The 2018 World Cup bidding process only exacerbated
these fears of bias, as President Blatter made it clear that FIFA
planned to only consider European candidates, despite no clear policy
to support such a decision.49
D. 2022 Bid Suspicion and How Policy Changes May Be Required
This European bias casts doubt upon the integrity of the entire
bidding process, with 2022 as a prime example. The World Cup has
never been held in Qatar, or anywhere in the surrounding region. It
appears Blatter's policy is to place World Cups in new areas or places
it has not been in a long time,50 so the United States and the other
2022 bidders may wonder if their bids ever truly had a chance. These
countries may wonder if-like the 2018 bids-Blatter and FIFA were
only going to consider certain countries.51
The voting itself for the 2022 World Cup also raised questions
about possible misconduct. In round one, Qatar received eleven votes,
Korea four, the United States three, Japan three, and Australia was
eliminated with only one vote.52 In round two, however, Qatar only
46. Rotation Ends in 2018, FIFA.COM (Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.fifa.com/
worldcup/russia2018/organisation/media/newsid=625122/index.html.
47. Gauthier, supra note 9, at 16.
48. Id.
49. Owen Gibson, England's 2018 World Cup Hopes Boosted by Europe-Only
Bid Process, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2010, 05:07 EST), http://www.guardian.co
.uk/football/2010/jan/26/england-2018-world-cup-european-bid.
50. As in, for instance, the World Cups held in South Africa and Brazil in
2010 and 2014. See Gauthier, supra note 9, at 14.
51. Gibson, supra note 49.
52. Russia and Qatar to Host 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, Respectively,
FIFA.CoM (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/russia2018/organisation
/media/newsid=1344971/index.html [hereinafter Russia and Qatar to Host].
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received ten votes, while the United States and Korea had five votes
each and Japan was eliminated with two votes. 53 What caused Qatar
to lose a vote and Japan two votes in this round? Because the vote is
done by secret ballot,54 whoever abruptly changed votes cannot be
asked why. This strange development led some to surmise that some
type of one-round voting deal had been struck between Japan and
Qatar. One writer thought that perhaps Qatar and Japan had made
deals during the 2018 voting process held at the same time.5 5 Under
this theory, Qatar would exchange votes to attempt to win the required
absolute majority in the first voting round,56 and Japan would
exchange votes in order to get to the "less predictable" later rounds.5 7
That such vote-exchange schemes are possible shows that FIFA's
current bid process is flawed. The secret ballot allows voters to make
deals without fear of exposure, allowing countries to trade votes in
hopes of reaching the later rounds, where voters scramble to choose a
country once their favorites have been eliminated. Deals could even
potentially be made by voters between each round depending on
which countries were eliminated the previous round. The current
bidding and voting processes are very unpredictable and have the
potential for misconduct at many different stages. Changes must be
made to the voting process to provide confidence a bid is chosen
without improper influence.
II. THE QATAR CONTROVERSY
A. Background
The Qatar controversy began in October 2010, long before any
vote on the bids. At that time, two reporters for an English
newspaper, the Sunday Times, posed as businessmen, and reported
that two FIFA executives, Amos Adamu of Nigeria and Reynald
53. Id.
54. World Cup Vote-Decision Day As It Happened, BBC SPORT, bttp://news
.bbc.co.uk/sport2/bi/football/9247651.stm (last updated Dec. 2, 2010, 17:31 GMT).
55. Richard Farley, Qatar World Cup: How the Voting Broke for World Cup
2022 Hosts, SB NATION (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.sbnation.com/soccer/2010/
12/2/1851282/qatar-world-cup-voting-2022-hosts.
56. Id.
57. Id.
2012] 549
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Termarii of Tahiti, had offered to sell their votes, leading FIFA to bar
both men from the voting process. FIFA's ethics committee,
pending further investigation, provisionally suspended these two
men. 59 In November 2010, the committee banned Temaraii for one
year and fined him 5,000 Swiss francs for breaching the ethics code. 60
The committee then banned Adamu for three years and fined him
10,000 Swiss francs for breaching five articles of the ethics code, one
of which was based on a finding of bribery.6 1
Despite this scandal, in December 2010, FIFA awarded Russia
and Qatar the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, respectively. 62 The award
to Qatar was particularly controversial, as FIFA's own technical report
stated the high temperatures in Qatar could pose a health risk to not
only players but to officials and spectators as well. 63
B. The United Kingdom's Response
Parliament in the United Kingdom began an inquiry in May 2011
as to why England failed to secure the 2018 World Cup awarded to
Russia. 64 Damian Collins, a Parliament member, told Parliament that
the Sunday Times also had evidence that Qatar had paid off Issa
Hayatou of Cameroon and Jacques Anouma of the Ivory Coast. 65 The
paper claimed these accusations against Hayatou and Anouma were
not published in their previous reports because of legal reasons.6 6 The
newspaper, in their letter to the parliamentary inquiry, said the
accusations were made by a whistleblower who had worked for
Qatar's 2018 bid, and wrote that "[t]he whistleblower's allegations
raise questions about the validity of Qatar's winning bid."67 FIFA
58. Jer6 Longman, Six From FIFA Are Accused in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES
(May 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/sports/soccer/six-top-fifa-
officials-named-in-bribery-investigation.html.
59. Timeline, supra note 5.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Longman, supra note 58.
67. Id.
10
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later claimed the Sunday Times had no evidence regarding the
allegations against Hayatou and Anouma.6 8
Also at the parliamentary hearing, a former Football Association69
chairman accused four FIFA Executive Committee members of
requesting favors in exchange for their votes. 70 FIFA later issued a
statement indicating these individuals had been cleared of the
allegations in an independent report commissioned by the Football
Association."
C. FIFA's Response
Other allegations unrelated to the Qatar controversy were
unearthed when the Qatar story and subsequent Parliamentary
investigation increased the amount of attention paid to FIFA by many
around the world. FIFA, through its Ethics Committee, began to
investigate the steady flow of allegations of misconduct involving
some of its high ranking members. First, FIFA opened an ethics
investigation regarding confederation Presidents Mohamad Bin
Hamman of Asia and Jack Warner of the Confederation of North,
Central American and Caribbean Association Football
(CONCACAF), concerning a meeting of the Caribbean Football
Union.72 Bin Hammam appeared to answer allegations that he had
arranged for bribes to be made to twenty-five presidential voters on a
campaign visit to the Caribbean.73 Bin Hammam, who was FIFA
President Sepp Blatter's sole challenger in the FIFA presidential
election on June 1, withdrew his candidacy hours before the ethics
committee hearing in late May.74 He had decided to run for the
presidency after playing a key role in Qatar's winning bid for the 2022
68. No Evidence on Allegations Made Against FIFA Executive Committee
Members at the House of Commons, FIFA.CoM (May 30, 2011), http://www.fifa
.com/aboutfifa/organisation/administration/news/newsid= 1444125/index.html.
69. The Football Association is the governing body of soccer in England.
70. Timeline, supra note 5.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Mohamed Bin Hammam Quits Election, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/sports/
soccer/news/ _/id/6602952/mohamed-bin-hammam-quits-fifa-presidential-election-
ethics-hearing (last updated May 28, 2011, 10:08 PM ET).
74. Timeline, supra note 5.
2012] 551
11
Morris: FIFA World Cup 2022: Why the United States Cannot Successfully Ch
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2012
552 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 42
World Cup.7 5 At Bin Hamman's request, Blatter was also summoned
to appear before the ethics committee. 76  Bin Hamman believed
Blatter was aware of cash payments allegedly made on Bin Hamman's
visit to the Caribbean. The committee cleared Blatter, but initially
suspended7 ' and later banned Bin Hamman from taking part in
football-related activity for the remainder of his life at the national or
international level.79
In May 2011, an email was leaked in which FIFA general
secretary Jerome Valcke claimed Qatar had "bought" the rights to host
the 2022 World Cup, although Valcke later claimed his comments
were misconstrued.80
The following month, Blatter won the presidential election as the
only candidate, despite attempts by the English and Scottish Football
Associations to delay the voting process. 1  German Football
Federation President Theo Zwanziger called for FIFA to reexamine
the 2022 World Cup award to Qatar.82 Addressing FIFA congress
delegates, Blatter announced that in the future the location for World
Cups would be decided by a congressional vote.83  The congress
would vote from a shortlist of candidates given to them by the
Executive Committee, but would not be given any guidance or
preference.84
Although it is not clear who took part in the Qatar controversy, it
is evident that misconduct is not rare within FIFA. Additionally, it
seems likely that the decision to award Qatar the 2022 World Cup was
influenced by some type of misconduct between the bidders from
75. Mohamed Bin Hammam Quits Election, supra note 73.
76. Timeline, supra note 5.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Ethics Committee Bans Football Officials, FIFA.COM (July 23, 2011),
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/news/newsid=1479068/index.htm
1.
80. Timeline, supra note 5.
81. Sepp Blatter Wins Re-Election as President of FIFA, BBC SPORT (June 1,
2011, 19:39 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/13610973.stm
82. Timeline, supra note 5.
83. Sepp Blatter Announces World Cup Host Vote Changes, BBC SPORT (June
1, 2011, 17:13 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/13613128.stm.
84. Id.
12
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Qatar and those members of FIFA voting on the bid. The obvious
question then is, what can be done?
III. REMEDIES THROUGH THE RULES OF FIFA
A. Judicial Bodies of FIFA
FIFA has both a disciplinary code and a code of ethics through
which the United States could attempt to seek relief. These two codes
differ, however, as to who they apply to and as to what conduct they
cover.
1. Disciplinary Code
The disciplinary code "describes infringements of the rules in
FIFA regulations, determines the sanctions incurred, regulates the
organisation and function of the bodies responsible for taking
decisions and procedures to be followed before these bodies."85
However, due to the limited scope of this code, the remedies available
are not helpful to the United States. Those subject to the code are
associations, members of associations, officials, players, match
officials, licensed match and players' agents, anyone with the
authorization from FIFA, and spectators. 86 Members of the Executive
Committee-including those who allegedly took the bribes in the
Qatar controversy-do not appear on this list. Additionally, the code
begins by saying that the Executive Committee is the body that
enforces this code.87 Because the Executive Committee would not
likely enforce a code on its members, a remedy through the
disciplinary code would not likely be useful.
2. Code ofEthics
The Code of Ethics could be more useful. Article 1 of the code
specifies that the code applies to all officials.88 Officials are defined
85. FIFA Disciplinary Code, art. 1 (2011), available at http://www.fifa.com
/mm/document/affederation/administration/50/02/75/discoinhalte.pdf.
86. Id. art. 3.
87. Id.
88. FIFA Code of Ethics, art. 1 (2009), available at http://www.fifa.com
5532012]
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as "all board members, committee members, referees and assistant
referees, coaches, trainers, and any other person responsible for
technical, medical and administrative matters in FIFA, a confederation
association, league or club." 89  Thus, it seems that Executive
Committee members would have to answer to the Code of Ethics.
Additionally, Article 11 specifically forbids officials from giving and
accepting bribes, which they define as "any gifts or other advantages
that are offered, promised or sent to them to incite breach of duty or
dishonest conduct for the benefit of a third party. . . ."9o The code
allows the ethics committee to give out any of the disciplinary
measures defined in the FIFA Statutes and Disciplinary Code. 91 At
this point, the Ethics Committee has sanctioned some of the alleged
participants in this scandal for their alleged involvement. 92  The
problem is that no disciplinary measure currently exists in the FIFA
Statutes, Code of Ethics, or Disciplinary Code that would allow a
FIFA World Cup bid to be rescinded. All of the alleged participants
in the Qatar scandal could be reprimanded, yet this would do nothing
to prevent Qatar 2022.
B. Court ofArbitration for Sport
1. General Information
As recourse through FIFA's judicial bodies is either unlikely or
not useful, the United States would need to look instead for possible
remedies outside of FIFA in order to resolve this dispute. Articles 62-
64 of the FIFA Statutes describe how FIFA's legal disputes are
handled.93 FIFA recognized the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
as the body to resolve disputes between "FIFA, Members,
Confederations, Leagues, Clubs, Players, Officials and licensed match
agents and players' agents." 94 Article 62 says the provisions of the
CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration shall apply and that CAS will
/mm/document/affederation/administration/50/02/82/efsdcodeofethicsweb.pdf
89. Id.
90. Id. art. 11.
91. Id. art. 17.
92. See supra Part II.C.
93. FIFA Statutes, supra note 14, arts. 62-64.
94. Id art. 62.
14
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apply the various regulations of FIFA primarily, and Swiss law
additionally. 95
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) created the CAS in
1984.96 The CAS held its first arbitration proceedings in 1986 and
rendered its first award in 1987.97 The CAS is headquartered in
Lausanne, Switzerland, and maintains offices in the United States and
Australia to allow potential litigants greater access to the court. 98 The
CAS went through major reforms in 1994, when the IOC gave up
direct control of the CAS by creating the International Council for
Arbitration of Sport (ICAS). 99 The ICAS is a body consisting of
twenty members who handle the financing and administration of the
CAS.' 00 CAS has two arbitration divisions: the Ordinary Arbitration
Division and the Appeals Arbitration Division. 01
In a case involving FIFA, Kenya Football Federation v. FIFA,102
the court noted that the Kenya Football Federation was addressing its
claim against FIFA by means of an "ordinary arbitration procedure,
and not by means of an appeal procedure directed against a decision
by FIFA."'o The United States would also be using the ordinary
arbitration procedure to get into CAS, as we discussed above that
remedies through FIFA judicial bodies are unlikely or not useful. The
U.S. Soccer Federation and FIFA would qualify as two parties the
FIFA Statutes list as giving the CAS jurisdiction. 04
95. Id.
96. Richard H. McLaren, Twenty-Five Years of the Court of Arbitration for
Sport: A Look in the Rear-View Mirror, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 305, 306 (2010).
97. Id. (citing H.E. Judge Kdba Mbaye, Foreward, in DIGEST OF CAS AwARDS
1986-1988, at xi-xii (Matthieu Reeb ed., (1998)) (Judge Mbaye is the President of
ICAS and CAS).
98. Abbas Ravjani, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: A Subtle Form of
International Delegation, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 241, 248 (2009).
99. Id. at 251-52.
100. Id. at 251.
101. Ekpedeme Edem, International Sport Arbitration: a Different Ballgame,
13-2 INT'L BAR ASs'N ARB. NEWSL. 54, 55 (2008).
102. Kenya Football Federation v. FIFA, CAS 2008/0/1808 (2010), available
at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/4164/5048/0/20100427131224215.
103. Id. at 11.
104. FIFA Statutes, supra note 14, art. 62.
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2. CAS Jurisdiction Issues
The fact that the CAS is the sole court to have jurisdiction is
somewhat troubling from the outside looking into FIFA. The bar on
"ordinary courts of law" without authorization from FIFA
regulation'os is also troubling. Why do all these countries agree to
stay out of ordinary courts of law and agree to the jurisdiction of
CAS? Examining the FIFA statutes and recognition of arbitration
courts in the United States shows that FIFA members, including the
United States, may not have much of a choice.
Agreeing to CAS arbitration is often a prerequisite for athletes
hoping to compete in international sports competitions such as the
World Cup.' 0 6 The FIFA statutes themselves state, "Confederations,
Members and Leagues shall agree to recognize CAS as an
independent judicial authority and to ensure that their members,
affiliated Players and Officials comply with the decisions passed by
CAS."' Thus, it seems that membership in FIFA requires agreeing
to CAS jurisdiction. Some may respond apathetically to this
predicament by pointing out that no one is forced to join FIFA. This
argument, however, is short sighted because any country that wishes
to play in the World Cup is required to join FIFA. Thus, for most,
joining FIFA is a no-brainer, so they acquiesce to CAS jurisdiction
simply as a matter of course.108
Additionally, many countries have agreed to jurisdiction of these
arbitration courts in a non-explicit manner. Recognizing the need to
help enforce arbitration awards, many countries came together in 1958
and adopted the New York Convention.109 Ravjani contends that all
countries that have adopted the convention, 143 to date,110 have
implicitly agreed to enforce awards by any arbitral body, subject to
meeting standards of fairness and legitimacy, which he argues the
CAS falls into.' The United States, one of the nations that adopted
105. Id. art. 64.
106. Ravjani, supra note 98, at 242.
107. FIFA Statutes, supra note 14, art. 64.
108. Ravjani, supra note 98, at 249.
109. Id. at 261.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 262.
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the Convention, has deferred to the judgment of these arbitral
tribunals in sports. 112 From this it seems possible that some soccer
federations, without even being aware of it, have given jurisdiction to
the CAS if they reside in a country that has adopted the New York
Convention. This is unfair. No party should be subject to the
jurisdiction of a court unless he or she willfully agrees to it. Instead,
countries joining FIFA must choose either to agree to resolve all
disputes with FIFA in the CAS or to stay on the sidelines in
international soccer.
C. Swiss Federal Tribunal
If a CAS ruling went against the United States, there would still
be a right to appeal that decision to the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT),
the Supreme Court of Switzerland." 3 A CAS award is final and
binding subject only to review by the SFT.114
IV. How FIFA WOULD FARE IN CAS AND SFT PROCEEDINGS
A. Treatment of FIFA in the CAS
FIFA is relatively new to CAS, with FIFA only giving the court
jurisdiction as the final appeal body in 2002." Although FIFA was
the last Olympic sport to do this,116 FIFA now accounts for about
thirty to forty percent of the CAS caseload.' 17 It does not appear at
this time that any patterns have developed in terms of favoring or not
favoring FIFA." 8 If the CAS were to be biased, it would seem more
112. Id. at 264.
113. Is It Possible to Appeal Against a CAS Award?, CAS, http://www.tascas.
org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-231-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last visited Mar. 20,
2012).
114. Id; Matthew J. Mitten, Judicial Review of Olympic and International
Sports Arbitration Awards: Trends and Observations, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
51 (2009).
115. McLaren, supra note 96, at 315.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Aris FC v. FIFA, CAS 2007/A/1251, at 11 (2007), available at
http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1251.pdf
(decision setting aside FIFA's appealed decision); Madrid Sociedad Anonima
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likely to be in favor of the IOC, since it created the CAS.1 19 This was
in fact a concern early on in CAS proceedings as the IOC had a major
influence during the first ten years, supplying the majority of the
budget for the CAS.120  The IOC also had a lot of control over
arbitrator appointments and rules of the court.121 This retained power
of the IOC began to end with an appeal to the SFT, in which a horse
rider named Elmar Gundel claimed that the CAS was not sufficiently
independent from the IOC.12 2 The SFT upheld the CAS ruling, but in
dicta noted it found certain parts of the relationship between the CAS
and IOC troubling, especially aspects surrounding funding and
membership.123 In response to this, the CAS attempted to eliminate
these concerns of bias by drastically restructuring the courts, making
them more independent of the IOC.124 These changes were put to the
test in a 2003 case brought to the SFT surrounding the 2002 Winter
Olympics.1 25 In this case, in which the IOC was a party, the SFT not
only approved these new changes to the CAS but also contended that
the CAS had become a "true 'supreme court of world sport."'
126
Deportiva v. FIFA, CAS 2006/A/1008, at 5 (2006), available at http://jurisprudence.
tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1008-P.pdf (decision in favor of
party opposing FIFA); Irish Football Ass'n v. Football Ass'n of Ir., CAS
2010/A/2071, at 27 (2010), available at http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/Case
Law/Shared%20Documents/2071.pdf (decision in favor of FIFA); Kenya Football
Federation, supra note 102, at 162.
119. McLaren, supra note 96, at 306.
120. Ravjani, supra note 98, at 273 (citing Matthieu Reeb, The Role and
Functions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in THE COURT OF
ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004 at 31, 33 (Ian S. Blackshaw et al. eds., 2006)).
121. Id.
122. Swiss Fed. Trib. G. v. Fed'n Equestre Internationale, CAS 92/63 (1993).
123. Ravjani, supra note 98, at 274 (citing Swiss Fed. Tribunal G., supra note
122).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 274-75 (citing A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., in DIGEST OF
CAS AWARDS III 674, 675 (Matthieu Reeb & Estelle du La Rochefoucauld eds.,
2004)).
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B. Anticipated Outcome in CAS
Although the CAS may apply Swiss law additionally to FIFA law,
it is clear from the FIFA Statutes that FIFA law will be the primary
basis for a CAS decision.127 This makes it impossible for the CAS to
rescind a bid award, because FIFA rules do not discuss rescinding
bids. Removing an international sporting event from a country is not
without precedent, however. The 2011 Cricket World Cup was
supposed to be hosted by India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan.128 After gunmen attacked the Sri Lankan team in Pakistan in
March of 2009, the International Cricket Council (ICC) removed the
fourteen games to be played in Pakistan.' 29 Although an international
body did this on its own, and not the CAS, it does show that such
recourse is not completely unprecedented. Granted, the Cricket World
Cup was co-hosted, so removing Pakistan as a host would seem to not
be as complicated as removing Qatar, the sole host of the World Cup.
Thus, although the ICC has removed games from a co-hosted event, it
is not analogous enough to overcome the limitations placed upon CAS
by FIFA's grant of jurisdiction to it.130 Considering all the relevant
statutes available to the CAS to rule on, it seems as though the CAS
would likely rule in favor of FIFA. There is no statute within FIFA
that calls for a re-vote on a World Cup bid or forcibly moving it from
one country to another. Ultimately, if the CAS ruling were not
favorable to the United States, there would still be a right to appeal the
decision to the SFT.131
C. How the SFT Would Likely Rule
As discussed above, the SFT is the sole court to which a party of a
CAS dispute can appeal.132 It appears, however, that the SFT rarely
overturns a CAS decision. The SFT will vacate an arbitration award
only if the CAS panel was "constituted irregularly, erroneously held
that it did or did not have jurisdiction, ruled on matters beyond the
127. FIFA Statutes, supra note 14, art. 62.
128. Gauthier, supra note 9, at 19.
129. Id.
130. . FIFA Statutes, supra note 14, art. 62.
131. Is It Possible to Appeal Against a CAS Award?, supra note 113.
132. Id.
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submitted claims, or failed to rule on a claim,"' 33 or if "the parties are
not treated equally by the CAS panel, if a party's right to be heard is
not respected, or if the award is incompatible with Swiss public
policy."' 34 The SFT has held that arbitrators will be presumed to act
impartially and, as of 2008, no CAS award has been vacated on the
ground that a CAS panel was constituted irregularly.13 5
Challenges to the fair hearing requirement have had some success,
as the SFT has held the CAS panel must explain their reasons for
deciding all the parties' arguments.' 36  The panel must explain its
decision to a level where the petitioner is satisfied that the panel has
considered all of his or her arguments, even if only to dismiss them.137
The SFT has, as of 2008, rejected challenges to CAS awards on the
basis that the merits, or the provision speaking of awards, are
incompatible with Swiss public policy.' 38 In one case, the SFT
explained that an award conflicted with public-policy concerns only
when it is made in "disregard of fundamental principles of law so as to
be inconsistent with the legal system and the accepted system of
values." 39 The court went on to give examples of such principles,
mentioning the "sanctity of contracts, the rules of good faith, the
prohibition against abuse of contractual or legal rights, the prohibition
against discrimination or spoliation and the protection of persons
incapable of legal acts." 40 Awards can also be challenged on the
basis that they violate the principles of "good faith and equal
treatment," which is incompatible with Swiss public policy.141
However, different factual situations can justify different CAS awards
without violating public policy.142
133. Mitten, supra note 114, at 54.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 57.
136. Id. at 58 & n.45.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 58.
139. Id. at 59 (citing Marc Biolley [Rep. of A. Sport] v. Ass'n Y. & TAS,
4A_506/2007 (2008) (Switz.), translated in 2 SwIss INT'L ARB. L. REP. 191 (2008)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 60.
142. Id. (citing Raducan v. IOC, P.427/2000 (2000) (Switz.), translated in
GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS: ISSUES OF FAST-
TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS LAW, at 80, 90 (2001)) (remarking that
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The United States has even recognized that the SFT is the only
body one can appeal to from a CAS ruling in Gatlin v. US. Doping
Agency, Inc.,143 holding that Gatlin's "remaining avenue for relief lies
with the Swiss Supreme Court."44 The district court, although it had
no choice, did find it "troubling" that the U.S. court system had no
power to "right a wrong perpetrated upon one of its citizens."l45 This
shows that although the U.S. courts cannot rule on these matters, they
wish they could, likely because they perceive what the international
courts did to Gatlin as a wrong.
Although there are grounds for the SFT to overturn a CAS award,
the court's reluctance to use these grounds when reviewing CAS
awards shows an appeal against the CAS is unlikely to be successful.
If the United States found itself in the SFT appealing a CAS award,
FIFA would likely prevail because of this reluctance.
V. FIFA REFORM PLANS
After these numerous scandals surrounding bids and elections
within FIFA,14 FIFA President Sepp Blatter introduced his reform
plan, which included creating three new task forces as well as a "Good
Governance Committee." 47 Blatter said in a press conference in
November 2011 that he hopes to have these reforms implemented by
2013.148 The three new task forces will be concerned with reforms
within the realms of the FIFA Statutes, the Ethics Committee, and
Transparency and Compliance within FIFA.149  The Football 2014
task force, which began its work in May 2011, would be continued
the difference between ways urine was tampered with at a doping lab allowed CAS
to rule in favor of one athlete but not the other).
143. Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-241/LAC/EMT,
2008 WL 2567657 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
144. Id. at *1.
145. Id. at *2.
146. See supra Part II.
147. FIFA Reveals Anti-Corruption Reform Plans, CNN (Oct. 21, 2011, 06:50
AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/21/sport/football/football-fifa-blatter-corrup
tion/?hpt-ieumid; Blatter: Committee Can Probe WC Choices, MSN FOXSPORTS,
http://msn.foxsports.com/foxsoccer/world/story/sepp-blatter-fifa-president-good-
governance-committee-reforms- 112511 (last updated Nov. 25, 2011, 8:06 PM ET).
148. FIFA Reveals Anti-Corruption Reform Plans, supra note 147.
149. Id.
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under the supervision of German soccer legend Franz Beckenbaurer,
according to Blatter.150 This task force is designed to "develop and
look at concrete proposals to improve both the attractiveness of
football and match control in elite competitions, in areas such as Laws
of the Game, refereeing, competition regulations, women's football,
medical matters and fair play."' 5 '
When FIFA ultimately created the Good Governance Committee
in mid-December of 2011, it was no longer called the Good
Governance Committee but was called the Independent Governance
Committee (IGC).15 2 FIFA named Mark Pieth as the leader of the
IGC.153 Pieth came from an organization which deals with economic
cooperation and bribery.154 The mandate of the committee was to
advise FIFA on how to implement anti-corruption controls. 55
According to FIFA's website, FIFA reforms have been on track in
terms of the roadmap FIFA set out as of December 2011.156 As
planned, FIFA established the IGC on December 17, 2011.15
According to the roadmap, the first feedback and proposals by the
IGC will be sent to the Executive Committee in March 2012.158
Additionally, as of January 2012, the Executive Committee was
planning to approve reform proposals of the four task forces in March
as well.'59  In June 2012, FIFA plans for the FIFA Congress to
approve and implement changes to the FIFA Statutes.' 60 Additionally,
the Ethics Committee will start working in their new two-chamber
150. Id.
151. FIFA Task Force Football 2014 Sets Out Next Proposals, FIFA.COM
(Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/bodies/news/newsid
=1532355/index.html.
152. See Samuel Rubenfeld, FIFA Names Governance Committee Members,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2011, 6:19 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/
2011/12/19/fifa-names-governance-committee-members/.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Road Map, FIFA.coM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/
footballgovernance/process/roadmap.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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structure at that time.1 61 Third, Congress will also address the bidding
process for future World Cups in June.' 62 In June 2013, Congress is
set to elect new members of the Ethics Committee as well as approve
any further changes to be made to the FIFA Statutes.163
Those in the United States following the Qatar situation might
have had held on to the hope that FIFA would right the wrong, as
Blatter said in an interview in November 2011 that the IGCl64 would
have the power to review the process that led to the World Cups being
awarded to both Russia and Qatar. 16 5 Blatter, however, did not say in
the interview that such a review would necessarily occur. 166 When
asked about the possibility of review, Blatter said, "[i]f somewhere,
something appears ... this committee has to have a look [at] that and
report it."l67 However, when Blatter was then asked if a process was
in place that would allow for a bid to be rescinded, Blatter answered
vaguely, saying, "[a]nd then we will see what will happen." 68
Although it was not clear how suggestions surrounding the
bidding process would be received by FIFA, once the task forces and
committees began making suggestions for reforms the World Cup
bidding process was in the forefront.169 Pieth, the leader of the IGC,
recommended drastic changes to the World Cup bidding process,
calling the current process a "mix of corruption risk and conflict of
interest concerns."1 70 Pieth thinks that changes to the bidding process
would help prevent manipulation.17 1 He believes the decision to turn
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Though Blatter was still calling it the Good Governance Committee at the
time of the interview. Blatter: Committee Can Probe WC Choices, supra note 147.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Martyn Ziegler, World Cup Bid Process Leads FIFA Reform
Recommendations, INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.independent.
co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/world-cup-bid-process-leads-fifa-reform-
recommendations-6269990.html.
170. Id.
171. Id.
2012] 563
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the final vote over to the FIFA Congress as opposed to the Executive
Committee was "a step in the right direction."' 72
Two remarks Pieth made about his role and the role of the IGC,
however, essentially destroy any hope that those in the United States
had about the Qatar situation. First, when the IGC was established,
Pieth told news outlets that his advice was "non-binding;" that he had
"no decision power;" and that they would have to "convince" FIFA.173
Second, Pieth made it clear that he and the IGC would only be making
suggestions for the future, not looking into past violations of FIFA
members.174 This decision by Pieth-and ultimately FIFA-was one
of the key reasons that led Transparency International (TI) to cut ties
with FIFA.'7 ' TI is a group that had made a much more drastic reform
proposal in August of 2011.176 Although FIFA ultimately did not
implement their proposal, TI came aboard to advise FIFA during the
reform process.177 TI also felt that FIFA paying Pieth would cause
problems with his independence from FIFA. TI's sports advisor said
that TI believed someone paid by FIFA could not be a member of the
independent commission as "[h]e has a contract with F[IFA] so he is
not independent in that sense."178
At this point, it is unclear what effect the FIFA reforms will
ultimately have on FIFA procedures and laws. It seems though, that
FIFA has handicapped their own reform groups through actions such
as limiting the IGC to future suggestions and not giving the IGC the
authority to rescind bids.179 These limitations have driven away TI,
whose involvement many thought to be very important to Blatter's
172. Id.
173. Carolyn Bandel & Tariq Panja, FIFA Anti-Corruption Panel May Be
Further Expanded, Pieth Says, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2011, 6:34 AM PT),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-17/fifa-anti-corruption-panel-may-be-
further-expanded-pieth-says.html.
174. Ziegler, supra note 169.
175. Transparency International Cuts Ties with FIFA, BBC (Dec. 1, 2011,
20:54 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15996806 [hereinafter TI Cuts
Ties].
176. See infra Part VII.B.
177. TI Cuts Ties, supra note 175.
178. Id.
179. See Ziegler, supra note 169.
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reform plans.so With groups like TI cutting ties and the reforms
being limited by FIFA and the independence of these reforms possibly
being compromised by FIFA, one cannot feel confident that anything
of consequence will ultimately come out of the IGC or the task forces.
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES TO FIFA
Under the current state of FIFA law, a remedy along the lines of a
revote or removal from Qatar seems impossible. With the CAS
required to stay within the parameters of the FIFA statutes for the
most part,' 8 ' and the SFT reluctant to overturn a CAS award,182
forcing FIFA to revote or rescind the bid is not an option. If this type
of misconduct cannot be remedied by the current FIFA system, then
perhaps the entire system needs to be changed. Although FIFA has
begun its own reform plans,183 the refusal to look at past allegations
would prevent the United States from righting this wrong with the
2022 World Cup vote. Additionally, the proposed changes to FIFA
for the future are not formed completely, and it cannot be properly
determined what effect they will have. The following section will
examine several proposals for FIFA reform, and will also propose an
entirely new route to FIFA reform by combining aspects of existing
proposals while adding additional checks on misconduct.
A. Proposed Changes to the Bidding Process
Ryan Gauthier, in his article, Improving the Bidding Process for
International Sporting Events, discusses problems with many
international sporting events, including the FIFA World Cup, and
suggests a new method for all such events.' 84
Gauthier sees four main problems with international sporting
events: lack of competition, economic inefficiency, poor decision
making, and reduced economic transparency/corruption. 85 Gauthier
then suggests a plan to solve these problems, including writing the
180. TI Cuts Ties, supra note 175.
181. See generally FIFA Statutes, supra note 14, art. 62.
182. See supra Part IV.C.
183. See supra Part V.
184. See generally Gauthier, supra note 9.
185. Id. at 28-33.
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bidding process clearly in governing documents, stabilizing the
process, creating a regional voting structure, using technical
evaluations to benchmark and monitor hosts, and creating an exit
strategy.1 6
In regards to a regional voting structure, Gauthier views FIFA as a
great example of how such a structure can help.'87 More than one-
third of the twenty-four members on FIFA's Executive Committee are
from Europe, which, as Gauthier points out, is more than two times
the number it would be if the regions were weighted evenly. 88
Instead, Gauthier suggests using regional voting blocs, perhaps giving
each region one vote or even three votes per region to allow for more
nuanced voting.189 This would not be a stretch for FIFA, which
already has regional divisions with its confederations such as the
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and
CONCACAF.190
Stabilizing the bidding process would also be useful for FIFA. In
the past, FIFA has created confusion by switching positions on issues
such as allowing co-hosted World Cups.191 A stable process ensures
that bidders know what set of rules they are dealing with while also
making "the process less susceptible to manipulation, especially by
the mere words of a single authority figure." 92
Implementing Gauthier's ideas would be beneficial to FIFA, as it
would provide a more stable bidding process while also making a non-
issue of the common complaint of European bias. Although Gauthier
discussed options involving either one or three votes per region,' 93
three seems more reasonable for FIFA, as larger confederations, like
UEFA, could further subdivide its three votes. Implementing a fairer
process to those outside Europe by evening out the votes would result
in less accusations of European misconduct. Having a more stable
186. Id. at 40-45.
187. Id. at 42.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 43.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 41.
192. Id. at 42. FIFA has had issues with single authority figures changing the
process, as in when Sepp Blatter decided on his own that that the 2018 World Cup
would be hosted by a European country. See supra Part I.C.
193. Id. at 43.
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process would reduce problems such as the confusion over rules on
co-hosting, saving bidding countries time and money wasted in bids
that do not conform with FIFA's ever-changing rules.' 94
B. FIFA Transparency Proposal
Transparency International (TI) released a report discussing how
FIFA could build integrity and transparency.' 95 TI describes itself as a
global civil society organization "leading the fight against
corruption."' 96 The report is significant, as FIFA, rather than ignoring
the report, acknowledged and responded to it on FIFA's website.197 in
the report, TI notes FIFA is ultimately answerable only to its national
football association members.' 98  In turn, those associations are
partially dependent upon FIFA for funds FIFA allocates to the
associations.199 TI says this "lack of mandatory accountability to the
outside world" makes change from within FIFA or the football
organizations very unlikely.200
TI calls for FIFA to create a "multi-stakeholder group" drawn
from FIFA's stakeholders, which TI claims to be happy to assist FIFA
in creating and establishing.2 0 1 TI also calls for greater transparency
within FIFA, including releasing more reports containing financial
data, the sources of funds, and allocation of those funds. 202 To help
prevent the dangers of corruption and bribery, TI suggests
implementing anti-bribery codes, listing six key principles applicable
to FIFA: (1) zero tolerance of bribery; (2) "articulate values, policies
and procedures for preventing the occurrence of bribery;" (3) "reflect
194. See id. at 42.
195. Sylvia Schenk, Safe Hands: Building Integrity and Transparency at
FIFA, IN Focus (Transparency Int'l, Berlin, Germany), Aug. 16, 2011, at 1,
available at http://www.playthegame.org/fileadmin/documents/TIFIFASafe
HandsEmbargoed.pdf.
196. Id.
197. FIFA Acknowledges Report by TI, FIFA.coM (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/news/newsid=1493338/index.html.
198. Schenk, supra note 195, at 2.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 3.
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the organisation's particular circumstances and culture;" (4) "be
consistent with all laws relevant to countering bribery;" (5)
"consultation with employees and other key stakeholders including
trade unions or other employee representative bodies;" and (6) "be
informed of all internal and external matters material to the effective
development and implementation of the program[]."203 TI recognizes
the awarding of World Cup hosting rights is a high-risk area of bribery
and should be recognized by FIFA as such.204 TI also suggests
establishing clearly published guidelines for the initiation and
execution of investigations, including ideas such as whistleblower
protection, appointment of independent ombudsmen, and suspicions
investigated by a body independent of the Executive Committee. 205
TI's approach is more comprehensive, and perhaps more ideal.
However, FIFA has already rejected them.20 6 Likely, calling for such
drastic changes and for FIFA to relinquish so much power 207 grounded
TI's proposal from the beginning. TI's ideas, however, were not
entirely placed by the wayside, as FIFA brought TI in to be part of an
outside panel to advise on reforms. 208  Sepp Blatter said TI was
specifically brought in to assist the good governance committee with
anti-corruption and anti-bribery. 209 Then, in December 2011, TI cut
ties with FIFA after TI claimed FIFA ignored two of its key
recommendations. 2 10 One problem in the eyes of TI was that FIFA
planned to pay an expert to oversee major reforms as to how FIFA is
run.2 11 As discussed above, TI saw this as something that would
jeopardize the independence of the expert.212 Additionally, the expert
said he would not reexamine old scandals, which was something TI
also felt was important. 213 This move by TI has been viewed as a
203. Id. at 3-4.
204. Id. at 5.
205. Id.
206. See TI Cuts Ties, supra note 175.
207. See Schenk, supra note 195.
208. TI Cuts Ties, supra note 175.
209. Blatter: Committee Can Probe WC Choices, supra note 147.
210. TI Cuts Ties, supra note 175.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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blow to the credibility of the FIFA reforms, as many thought the
involvement of TI was a key element to Blatter's strategy to fix the
corruption problems within FIFA.2 14
C. Combination Approach
The Gauthier approach to FIFA reform is less invasive and could
be implemented more easily-but may not be enough. Alternatively,
the TI approach could fix many of FIFA's current problems, but is
unlikely to be implemented. An approach combining aspects of the
two approaches by changing the bidding process and increasing
transparency may provide the correct balance between solving
problems and being conservative enough to avoid strong resistance
from FIFA.
1. Reduce the Number ofBids
There are too many bids voted on in the current FIFA process. 2 15
With so many bidding countries, it often takes several rounds of
voting to decide which country will host.2 16 FIFA should eliminate all
but two bidding countries prior to the voting process, as this would
reduce options and make the process more efficient. Initially, FIFA
should accept five bids to be narrowed down by some type of
technical evaluation. This evaluation should be out of the voters'
control so bidding countries know there is no foul play. Gauthier
advocates for having technical evaluations in these international
sporting events.217 Gauthier contends, however, that if these technical
evaluations are merely preliminary to a vote, they would serve only as
voter information rather than deciding anything.218  This proposal
would not have such pitfalls as it eliminates all but two bidding
countries prior to the vote.
Some would criticize this process for lack of considerations
beyond technical evaluations. They would say FIFA often considers
many things beyond technical aspects of a bidding country, such as a
214. Id.
215. See Russia and Qatar to Host, supra note 52.
216. Id.
217. Gauthier, supra note 9, at 44.
218. Id.
5692012]
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desire to spread the World Cup to different areas of the world. This
has been true especially as of late, with the 2010 World Cup in South
Africa and the 2014 World Cup heading back to South America in
Brazil.219 This system could account for these regional concerns by
making it part of the evaluation. For example, the evaluation could
consider whether a bidding country's region had previously hosted a
World Cup, and, if so, how long it has been since it last hosted. FIFA
could give more weight to this variable than other technical elements
to ensure this concern is addressed as fully as it desires.
The evaluation as a whole should be simple, as this would leave
less room for controversy. To this end, the proposed evaluation
should consist of only two scores. The first score should be
comprised of the technical scores, such as space for proper fan and
player accommodations, anticipated weather, safety, current stadiums
able to host games, plans for additional stadiums, and any other
evaluations FIFA might find useful. There remains the question of
how nuanced this technical score should be. Gauthier found that the
simpler a score is, the easier it is to justify.220 For assigning scores to
the different categories, Gauthier proposes a "0/1/2" option as
opposed to a typical 1-10 scale. 22' This, he says, would add clarity to
one's overall score, as it is more difficult to determine what
distinguishes a six from a seven on a ten-point scale, than a one from a
two on a "0/1/2" scale.22 2 Gauthier does point out, however, that with
little variation between scores under a "0/1/2" scale, the scores may
not be separated enough to be helpful.22 3  Because there is less
variation between a zero and a two than there is between a one and a
ten, the technical evaluation would not give much more information
than voters simply selecting one bid or the other. However, because
FIFA is unlikely to yield this process to an independent body, it seems
more useful to control possible biases than provide a nuanced scoring
system, which would allow FIFA officials to tip the scales in favor of
areas they want to host. Therefore, FIFA should give the bidding
countries a score of zero, one, or two on various technical elements.
219. See id. at 14 (citing Rotation Ends in 2018, supra note 46).
220. Id. at 44.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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These scores would then be averaged to create an average technical
score.
The second score attributed to each bidding country would be a
score reflecting the regional concerns discussed above.224 This score
could be on the same 0/1/2 scale, or FIFA could allot more points to
this consideration to fulfill its goal to spread the World Cup around
the globe. To this end, a scaled-score of 0-4 is appropriate: a country
located in a region which has never before hosted a World Cup would
receive a score of four; a country in a region not hosting for three or
more World Cups would receive a three; a country in a region not
hosting for two World Cups would receive a two; a country in a
region not hosting for one World Cup would receive a one; and a
country in a region that hosted the directly previous World Cup would
receive a zero. This would help FIFA spread the World Cup
throughout the world while also providing checks on possible biases
to certain areas of the world.
Even with these technical evaluations, however, it is possible that
corrupt sources within FIFA could still manipulate the process to
control the location of the World Cup. For example, if FIFA wanted
the World Cup in Qatar, they could sidestep the above proposed
process in two ways. First, they could choose Qatar and four
countries close to Qatar as the five bids to undergo technical
evaluations. This would ensure that the World Cup would either be in
Qatar, or somewhere close. Second, FIFA could pair Qatar with four
bids that FIFA knows will score significantly less than Qatar, such as
small countries that do not have the proper facilities to host a World
Cup. To combat these possible loopholes, another evaluation should
be added. This would not be a numerical evaluation to average with
the score, but rather would require FIFA to identify each bid as either
"qualified" or "not qualified" based upon a bid's first technical score.
If the bid received a technical score below a certain number, it would
be labeled as "not qualified." This is similar to the system used by the
American Bar Association with judges.225 This system would
disallow "not qualified" bids to move on to the voting round. Under
224. See supra Part VI.C. .
225. See Charlie Savage, Ratings Shrink President's List for Judgeships, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/us/politics/screening-
panel-rejects-many-obama-picks-for-federal-judgeships.html?pagewanted=all.
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this system, Qatar may have been deemed "not qualified" because of
its potentially unsafe temperatures.
In summary, each bid would have a technical score, a score
reflecting regional concerns, and a label as either "qualified" or "not
qualified." The two numerical scores would be combined so each bid
would have one score. After this evaluation, the two highest scoring
"qualified" bids would move on to a vote.
2. Revise the Voting Process
A new voting process should be implemented in order to make the
overall World Cup decision fairer. The regional bloc voting structure
proposed by Gauthier is logical as there is currently a disproportionate
amount of European influence in the Executive Committee.226 It may,
however, be problematic because Europe will not want to have a
smaller voice than regions like CONCACAF. Europe will likely
argue their vote should carry more weight because they have more
members in FIFA. Those in the United States recognize this problem
as similar to the one the U.S. founding fathers dealt with when
drafting the U.S. Constitution. 227 A compromise similar to the one
struck by the founding fathers may be the best option here as well:
FIFA should institute a system similar to a bicameral legislature in
order to eliminate regional bias, give smaller regions a legitimate
voice, and still honor the larger voices of regions like Europe.
First, there would be a Senate-like chamber, with regions having
equal voting power. Giving each region only one vote would be
troublesome, however, as there are only six confederations in FIFA
and some are so large that it would likely lead to disparity and
controversy within the voting blocs. 228  Therefore, as Gauthier
discussed, each confederation should be given three votes. 229 Each
confederation would choose how to cast its votes. For example,
226. Gauthier, supra note 9, at 42.
227. Heavily populated states wanted congressional representation determined
by population; small states, however, wanted equal representation. See generally
Matthew J. Festa, The Origins and Constitutionality of State Unit Voting in the
Electoral College, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2099, 2108 (2001).
228. See Confederations, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/
organisation/confederations/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
229. See Gauthier, supra note 9, at 43.
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UEFA, which currently holds eight votes in the Executive
Committee,2 30 could have those eight members cast votes for UEFA's
own regional voting purposes. If the vote came back with a score of
five votes for one bid and three votes for the other, UEFA could allot
two of its overall votes to the first bid, and its third regional vote for
the third bid. Alternatively, UEFA could regionalize itself and give
each subregion one vote, which could lead to different results
depending on how the regions were subdivided. In the end, eighteen
votes would be cast, three from each confederation.231 These votes
would be counted and a bidding country would be selected to move on
to the next level. In case of a tie, the highest scoring bid from the
previous round would be sent to the next level. This method of
tiebreaking, in contrast to giving the FIFA President the tiebreaking
vote, is unlikely to cause much backlash from those on the losing end.
After the Senate vote, the bid would be passed on to the next
level-akin to the House of Representatives-for the next phase of
voting. There, votes would be allocated to the confederations
proportionally to the number of members the confederation had within
FIFA. Since votes would be allocated proportionally, it ultimately
does not matter how many total votes are distributed in the House of
Representatives. However, the total number of votes should remain
low to eliminate the possibility for improper influence should the
regions decide to divide their votes.
The bid nominated by the lower level must receive a majority vote
from the House of Representatives in order to acquire the final bid. If
the smaller regions were able to pass a bid through the Senate against
the wishes of the larger regions, the larger regions could voice their
opinion with authority at the House of Representatives stage.
If the House of Representatives rejects a bid, the process begins
again in the Senate, with the Senate voting again on the rejected bid,
as well as the bids that scored second and third in the technical
evaluation stage. The Senate could override the rejection with a
seventy-five percent vote. It is necessary to allow the Senate to
consider the third place bid in order to prevent the House of
Representatives from having all the power. A rejection of the
230. Id. at 42.
231. There are six confederations; giving three votes to each confederation
would equal eighteen total votes. See Confederations, supra note 228.
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Senate's bid would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for
that bid to be ultimately chosen. The Senate would have to go through
the seventy-five percent vote override process, and, if that was not
successful, they would have to choose the second place bid. Allowing
the third place bid to be voted on maintains the check on the House's
power. Once a bid makes it through both levels of voting, that
country would be awarded the rights to host the FIFA World Cup.
3. Promote Transparency
As shown by TI, FIFA would benefit from added transparency.
As discussed above, however, TI's proposal is radical and calls for
tremendous changes. As this is unlikely to be adopted by FIFA,
ushering in heightened transparency to a high-risk area, such as the
bidding process, may be an easier pill for FIFA to swallow. In this
proposal, the technical evaluation scores, the regional concern scores,
and final votes by both the Senate and the House of Representatives
would be available to the public via the FIFA website. Transparency
keeps entities like FIFA accountable for their actions and can expose
errors or foul play in the evaluation and voting process. This small
step can ease the nerves of World Cup fans in regards to the bidding
process. Further, when this program produces bids with both
technical support and less foul play, the public approval could drive
FIFA to institute more transparency policies that groups like TI have
suggested.
CONCLUSION
Overall, rescinding the Qatar World Cup bid without consent of
FIFA is a difficult task. Although ethics violations can be brought
within FIFA for individual members, 232 nothing in FIFA law requires
FIFA to rescind the bid or hold a revote. Although the members
allegedly committing corruption this time could be suspended or
banned, there is nothing to stop subsequent members from committing
the same unruly acts. Additionally, although relief through the CAS is
available, 233 a result against FIFA is not likely, as CAS must apply
FIFA law primarily, 234 and there is no clear Swiss policy in place that
232. FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 88, art. 1.
233. FIFA Statues, supra note 14, arts. 62-64.
234. Id. art. 62.
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would be helpful to the United States. Further, due to the limited
instances the SFT will vacate a CAS decision, 235 relief through that
court is also unlikely. Although FIFA plans to institute their own
reforms,2 36 these reforms will only be prospective, not retrospective,
once again leaving the Qatar scandal untouched. The most likely
avenue through which to obtain a remedy for the Qatar situation and
prevent future controversies may be for FIFA to implement large-
scale changes. If the plans proposed by Gauthier or TI were enacted,
perhaps the new FIFA, with more influence from independent sources,
would decide to rescind Qatar's bid and hold a revote. The combined
approach proposed by this article would allow for the changes TI
would like to see on a macro level, while improving the bidding
process in a less radical way. Thus, FIFA would be more likely to
implement this proposal. The technical evaluations, two level voting
system, and transparency throughout the process would give World
Cup fans assurance that the accepted bid is a proper venue and was
secured without foul play.
One possible silver lining of the Qatar controversy is that the
Qatar World Cup is not until 2022.237 If it was sooner-say, 2014-
logistics would all but slam shut the potential of a change in venue.
However, with ten years remaining before the Qatar World Cup, FIFA
or the court systems have ample time to change their rules and
procedures in a way that could vindicate American soccer fans.
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